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Experience can change you in many different ways. To name just two:
it can teach you new things, thereby changing your epistemic state; and
it can lead you to change what you value and the extent to which you
value it, thereby changing your conative state. If an experience changes
you in the first way, L. A. Paul dubs it an epistemically transformative experi-
ence (henceforth, ETE). If it changes you in the second way, it is a personally
transformative experience (Paul, 2014, 2015). Paul argues that the possibility
of both sorts of experience poses serious and novel problems for the or-
thodox theory of rational choice, namely, expected utility theory.1 In this
paper, I will focus only on Paul’s argument that the possibility of ETEs
raises a challenge for expected utility theory — I will call her objection the
Utility Ignorance Objection. In a pair of earlier papers, I responded to Paul’s
challenge (Pettigrew, 2015, 2016), and a number of other philosophers have
responded in similar ways (Dougherty et al., 2015; Harman, 2015) — I will
call the argument that we have each put forward the Fine-Graining Response.
Paul (2014) has her own reply to this response, which we might call the
Authenticity Reply. But Sarah Moss has offered an alternative reply to the
Fine-Graining Response on Paul’s behalf (Moss, ms) — we’ll call it the No
Knowledge Reply. This appeals to the knowledge norms for action, together
with Moss’ novel and intriguing account of probabilistic knowledge. In
this paper, I consider Moss’ reply and argue that it fails. I argue first that it
fails as a reply made on Paul’s behalf, since it forces us to abandon many
of the features of Paul’s challenge that make it distinctive and with which
Paul herself is particularly concerned. Then I argue that it fails as a reply
independent of its fidelity to Paul’s intentions.
1While Paul targets expected utility theory with her objection, if it works, it affects the
whole gamut of non-expected utility theories as well (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Quiggin,
1993; Buchak, 2013; Wakker, 2010).
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Before we can state Paul’s challenge to decision theory, we have to make
clear exactly which version of that theory she wishes to challenge (§1). Hav-
ing done that, we can state Paul’s Utility Ignorance Objection to that theory
(§2), the Fine-Graining Response (§3), and Paul’s Authenticity Reply (§4).
Then, we introduce Moss’ No Knowledge Reply (§5). We argue that it fails
both as a reply on behalf of Paul (§6) and as a reply on its own (§7).
1 What is decision ?
Paul addresses her Utility Ignorance Objection to a particular interpretation
of decision theory, namely, the realist-deliberative interpretation. Let me
introduce this now by drawing two distinctions: the realist/constructivist
distinction and the deliberative/evaluative distinction.
First, the realist/constructivist distinction. Realist and constructivist
understandings of decision theory agree on the building blocks of decision
theory; they differ on which of these building blocks are more fundamental.
On both, we have the following:
• a set of possible actions the agent might perform — call that set A;
• a set of possible states of the world — call it S ;
• a preference ordering  over the possible actions in A;
• a credence function P over combinations of actions fromA and states
from S — given a in A and s in S , P(s||a) records how strongly the
agent believes that the world is in state s under the supposition that
they perform a;2 and
• a utility function U over combinations of actions from A and states
from S — given a in A and s in S , U(a & s) records how strongly the
agent values or desires or wants or endorses the outcome of perform-
ing action a when the world is in state s.
According to the constructivist understanding of decision theory, the
preference ordering is primary — for some constructivists of a more be-
haviourist persuasion, only the preference ordering is psychologically real;
for others, credence and utility functions are real too, but the preference
ordering is more fundamental than both. Typically, constructivists then
show that, providing that the preference ordering , set of states S , and
the set of possible actions A satisfy particular structural constraints — the
Savage (1954), Jeffrey (1983), or Joyce (1999) axioms, for instance — there
2If the supposition in question is indicative supposition, the resulting theory is evidential
decision theory (Jeffrey, 1983); if it is subjunctive supposition, the result is causal decision
theory (Joyce, 1999). The difference between them will not matter here.
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is a credence function P and a utility function U such that the preference
ordering places one action at least as high as another iff the expected util-
ity of the first is at least as great as the expected utility of the second;
that is, a1  a2 iff ExpP(U(a1)) ≤ ExpP(U(a2)), where ExpP(U(a)) =
∑s∈S P(s||a)U(a & s). That is, the preference ordering, which is primary,
can be represented by the credence function and the utility function, which
are thereby secondary. Such a result is known as a representation theorem,
and they are central to the constructivist understanding of decision theory.
On the other hand, the realist understanding of decision theory says that
the credence function and utility function are primary, while the preference
ordering on actions given by their expected utility relative to that credence
function and utility function is secondary. Thus, for the constructivist, we
begin with the preference ordering and derive the credence function and
utility function; for the realist, we begin with the credence function and
utility function and derive the preference ordering. For both, faced with a
decision between a range of possible actions, an agent is rationally required
to choose an action that sits at the top of the preference ordering — that is,
it is irrational to choose an action a in A when there is an alternative action
a∗ in A such that a ≺ a∗. Paul’s challenge applies primarily to the realist
understanding of decision theory.
Next, let’s turn to the deliberative/evaluative distinction. Deliberative
and evaluative understandings of decision theory differ on which elements
of a decision are relevant to its rationality. For those who favour a delib-
erative understanding, decision theory governs not only the choice that an
agent makes in a given situation, but also the deliberation by which she
comes to make that choice. In contrast, those who favour an evaluative un-
derstanding say that decision theory evaluates the choice only. Thus, for
instance, suppose I must decide whether or not to take an umbrella when
I leave my house. As it happens, I would maximise my expected utility
by taking the umbrella — I think it’s pretty likely to rain, I hate getting
wet, and it doesn’t much bother me to carry the umbrella. Now suppose
that I do indeed end up taking the umbrella. But suppose that my reason
for doing so was not that it would maximise my expected utility — it was
not by calculating which action would maximise expected utility and then
picking it that I reasoned to my conclusion. Rather, I chose the action I did
simply using the rule Always pick the action that involves approximating most
closely the sartorial choices of Mary Poppins. Then, according to the evaluative
understanding of decision theory, I am fully rational, because I chose the
option that maximises expected utility, while according to the deliberative
understanding, I am not, because I did not deliberate correctly concerning
my choice — my decision was not sensitive to the expected utility of the
actions between which I had to choose. Paul’s challenge applies primarily
to the deliberative understanding of decision theory.
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2 Paul’s Utility Ignorance Objection
What is an ETE? It is an experience that teaches you something that you
couldn’t come to know without having that experience. Thus, for Frank
Jackson’s scientist, Mary, who has lived her whole life in a monochrome
black-and-white room, the experience of stepping outside and seeing the
colour red for the first time is an ETE. However much Mary learned about
the physical properties of red objects, she could not know what it is like to
see red (Jackson, 1986). Similarly, for some people, becoming a parent for
the first time is an ETE. However much they attended to the testimony of
people who already have children, however much they read novels about
parenting, they couldn’t know what it was going to be like to be a parent
until they became one themselves (Paul, 2014).
In Mary’s case, what she learns from her ETE is a phenomenological fact
— she learns what it is like to see red. In the case of the new parent, there
is likely a phenomenological component to what they learn from the expe-
rience as well — they learn what it is like to feel a particular sort of bond
with another person; and they learn what it is like to have responsibility
for another life. But there may well be other components — the experience
might teach you some moral facts, for instance. For Paul’s objection, she
needs only this: ETEs teach you something that you cannot learn any other
way and that you need to know in order to know the utility that you assign
to the outcomes of certain actions that are available to you.
For instance, suppose I must decide whether or not to apply to adopt
a child and become a parent — this will serve as our illustrative example
throughout the paper. If I choose to apply and my application is successful,
I will become a parent. In order to calculate the expected value of choos-
ing to apply, I must therefore know the utility I assign to the outcome on
which I apply and my application is successful. But in order to know that,
I need to know what it will be like to be a parent. And that, for some peo-
ple, is something that they can know only once they become a parent. For
such people, then, it seems that the ingredients that they require in order
to calculate their expected utility for applying to adopt a child are not epis-
temically available to them. And thus they are barred from deliberating
in the way that the realist-deliberative understanding of decision theory
requires of them. They are unable to make the decision rationally.
Using the ingredients of decision theory introduced above, we can state
the problem as follows: there are two actions between which I must choose
— apply to adopt a child (Apply); don’t apply (Don’t Apply). And let’s say
that there are two states of the world — one in which I would be successful
if I were to apply (Succeed), and one in which I would be unsuccessful (Fail).
So the decision table is this:
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Succeed Fail
Apply ???U(Succeed & Apply)??? U(Fail & Apply)
Don’t Apply U(Succeed & Don’t Apply) U(Fail & Don’t Apply)
According to the realist, to choose whether or not to apply, I must deter-
mine whether I prefer applying to not applying — that is, whether Apply 
Don’t Apply or Apply ∼ Don’t Apply or Apply  Don’t Apply. To determine
that, I must calculate the expected utility of those two actions relative to
my credence function and my utility function. And to calculate that, I must
know what my credence is in each of the two possible states of the world
under the supposition of each of the possible actions — that is, I must know
P(Succeed||Apply) and P(Fail||Apply), as well as P(Succeed||Don’t Apply) and
P(Fail||Don’t Apply). And I must know my utilities for the different possi-
ble outcomes — that is, I must know U(Apply & Succeed) and U(Apply & Fail)
and U(Don’t Apply & Succeed) and U(Don’t Apply & Fail). The problem that
Paul identifies is that it is impossible to know U(Apply & Succeed) prior to
making the decision and becoming a parent; and thus it is impossible to
deliberate about the decision in the way that the realist-deliberative under-
standing of decision theory requires. Paul concludes that there is no ratio-
nal way to make such decisions. This is the Utility Ignorance Objection to
the realist-deliberative understanding of decision theory.
Before we move on to consider how we might respond to this objection,
let us pause a moment to consider its scope. First, note that the challenge
targets only the realist understanding of decision theory, not the construc-
tivist. For the constructivist, my credence and utility functions are deter-
mined by my preference ordering. Thus, to know them I need only know
my preference ordering. And for many constructivists I can know that sim-
ply by observing how I choose between given sets of actions. Paul’s chal-
lenge applies only when we take the utility function to determine, at least
in part, our preference ordering, as the realist does. Second, note that the
challenge targets only the deliberative understanding of decision theory,
not the evaluative. On the realist-evaluative understanding, I do not need
to know my credences or my utility function in order to be rational. On
this understanding, in order to be rational, I need only choose the action
that in fact maximises expected utility; I need not choose it because it max-
imises expected utility. Thus, Paul’s argument has no bite for the evaluative
understanding.
Now, we might try to extend Paul’s argument so that it does apply to
the realist-evaluative understanding. To do that, we need to argue not only
that I do not know U(Apply, Succeed) prior to my choice between Apply and
Don’t Apply, but indeed that U(Apply, Succeed) is not even determined prior
to that choice. If that is the case, then there is no way to make the choice
rationally, even according to the realist-evaluative understanding. Simi-
larly, if my preference between Apply and Don’t Apply is not even defined
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prior to my choice between them, then I cannot make that choice rationally,
even according to the constructivist. But of course this is not what Paul’s
argument establishes. The argument is explicitly epistemic.
3 The Fine-Graining Response
There is a natural response to Paul’s challenge. Expected utility theory is
designed to deal with decisions made in the face of uncertainty. Usually
that uncertainty concerns the way the world is beyond or outside of the
agent. For instance, suppose I’m uncertain whether my adoption applica-
tion would be successful if I were to apply. Then, when I’m making my
decision, I ensure that the set of possible states of the world includes one
in which my application succeeds and one in which it fails. I then quantify
my uncertainty concerning these two possibilities in my credence function,
and I use that to calculate my expected utility — perhaps I know that only
12% of adoption applications succeed, and I set my credence that mine will
succeed to 0.12 in line with that. However, there is no reason why the un-
certainty quantified by my credence function should concern only the way
the world is beyond me. What Paul’s argument shows is that I am un-
certain not only about the world, but also about the utility that I assign to
becoming a parent; I am uncertain not only about whether Succeed or Fail is
true, but also about the value U(Apply, Succeed). Thus, just as I ensured that
my decision problem includes possible states of the world at which I suc-
ceed in my application and possible states where I fail, similarly I should
respond to Paul’s challenge by ensuring that my decision problem includes
possible states of the world at which I become a parent and value it greatly,
possible states at which I become a parent and value it a moderate amount,
states at which I become a parent and value it very little, and so on. Having
done this, I should quantify my uncertainty concerning the utility I assign
to being a parent in my credence function, and use that to calculate my
expected utility as before.
More precisely, and simplifying greatly, suppose the possible utility val-
ues that I might assign to being a parent are−12, 3, and 10. Then, while my
original set of possible states of the world is S = {Succeed, Fail}, my new
expanded set of possible states of the world is
S∗ = {Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12,
Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3,
Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10,
Fail}.
Now, recall the problem that Paul identified. Given the original way of
setting up the decision problem, in order to deliberate rationally between
Apply and Don’t Apply, I need to know the utilities I assign to each possi-
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ble outcome of each of the possible actions. In particular, I need to know
U(Apply, Succeed). But I can’t know that until I make the decision and be-
come a parent. However, on the new formulation of the decision problem,
with the expanded set of states S∗, I do know the utilities I assign to each
possible outcome of each of the possible actions. For I know that:
• U(Apply, Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12) = −12,
• U(Apply, Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3) = 3,
• U(Apply, Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10) = 10,
Next, I quantify my uncertainty in these new possible states to give:
P(Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12||a),
P(Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3||a),
P(Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10||a),
P(Fail||a),
where a is either Apply or Don’t Apply. And, given this, I can calculate
my expected utility and discharge the obligations of rationality imposed
by the realist-deliberative understanding of decision theory. Paul’s Util-
ity Ignorance Objection, it seems, is answered. Call this the Fine-Graining
Response, since it involves expanding, or fine-graining, the set of possible
states of the world.
4 Paul’s Authenticity Reply
Paul herself is not satisfied with this response. She allows that I can expand
the set of possible states of the world in the way described. And she allows
that I can form credences in those different states of the world. But she
worries about the sort of evidence on which I might base those credences.
Let’s start with an ordinary decision that does not involve an ETE. Sup-
pose I am deciding whether to have chocolate ice cream or strawberry ice
cream. I have tasted both in the past, so I know what both experiences will
be like — neither experience would be transformative. As a result, when
I come to make my decision, I know the utility I assign to the outcome
in which I eat chocolate ice cream. I know it by imaginatively projecting
myself forward into the situation in which I am eating chocolate ice cream.
And I can do this because I have tasted chocolate ice cream in the past. And
similarly for the utility I assign to the outcome in which I eat strawberry ice
cream. I know what it is, and I know it because I’ve tasted strawberry ice
cream in the past and so I can imaginatively project myself forward into
the situation in which I’m eating it.
When I consider the utility I assign to becoming a parent, I can’t imagi-
natively project in this way, since I’m not a parent and becoming a parent is
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an ETE. As described above, I respond to this epistemic barrier by expand-
ing the set of possible states of the world I consider in my decision problem.
I expand them so that they are fine-grained enough that each specifies my
utility for becoming a parent at that world; and my credences in these dif-
ferent possible states quantify my uncertainty over them. But how do I
set those credences? I cannot do anything akin to imaginatively projecting
myself into the situation of being a parent, as I did with the chocolate ice
cream, because becoming a parent is an ETE. What can I do instead?
Well, the natural thing to do is to seek out the testimony of people who
have already undergone that transformative experience.3 Perhaps I cannot
discover from them exactly what it is like to be a parent — since it’s an
ETE, the only way to learn what it’s like is to undergo the experience. But
perhaps I can learn from them how much they value the experience. And
after all, that’s all that I need to know in order to make my decision ratio-
nally, according to the realist-deliberative understanding of decision theory
— expected utility theory doesn’t require that you know what an outcome
will be like; it requires only that you know how much you value it and thus
how much it contributes to the expected utility calculation. However, as we
all know, different people value being a parent differently. For some, it is
an experience of greater value than all other experiences they have in their
life. For others, it is a positive experience, but doesn’t surpass the value of
reciprocated romantic love, or extremely close friendships, or succeeding
in a career, or helping others. And for yet others, it is a negative experi-
ence, one that they would rather not have had. Simplifying greatly once
again, let’s assume that all parents fall into these three groups: members
of the first assign 10 utiles to the outcome in which they become a parent;
members of the second assign 3; and members of the third assign -12. And
let’s assume that 10% fall into the first group; 60% into the second; and 30%
into the third. Now, suppose that I learn this statistical fact by attending to
the testimony of parents. Then I might set my credences as follows (where
we assume for convenience that I am certain that my adoption application
will be successful, so P(Succeed||Apply) = 1):
• P(Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12 ||Apply) = 0.3,
• P(Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3 ||Apply) = 0.6,
• P(Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10 ||Apply) = 0.1,
With these in hand, I can then calculate the expected utility of Apply and
Don’t Apply, I can compare them, and I can make the choice between them
in the way that the realist-deliberative decision theorist requires.
3See (Dougherty et al., 2015) for two further ways in which I might set these credences.
I focus on testimonial evidence here since it is the sort of evidence that Moss considers.
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However, Paul claims that if I choose in this way then my decision is
badly flawed. She holds that an agent who made the decision to become a
parent in this way would be “alienated” from that decision; the choice thus
made would be “inauthentic”:
A [...] problem with leaving your subjective perspective out
of your decisions connects to the Sartrean point that making
choices authentically and responsibly requires you to make them
from your first personal perspective. A way to put this is that
if we eliminate the first personal perspective from our choice,
we give up on authentically owning the decision, because we
give up on making the decisions for ourselves. We give up our
authenticity if we don’t take our own reasons, values, and mo-
tives into account when we choose. To be forced to give up the
first person perspective in order to be rational would mean that
we were forced to engage in a form of self-denial in order to
be rational agents. We would face a future determined by Big
Data or Big Morality rather than by personal deliberation and
authentic choice. (Paul, 2014, 130)
For Paul, then, the problem lies in the way that I set my credences in the
fine-grained states of the world. I set my credences concerning my own
utilities by deferring to statistical facts about how others assign different
utilities. My evidence does not sufficiently concern my utilities; and thus
I am alienated from any decision based on the credences that I form in re-
sponse to that evidence. I am like the agent who makes a moral decision by
deferring to societal norms or the value judgements of the majority group,
rather than making those decisions herself. Paul contrasts this statistical
method of forming opinions about my own utilities with the method de-
scribed above in the case of the chocolate and strawberry ice cream, where
I imaginatively project myself into the situation in which I have the expe-
rience based on my own memory of previous similar experiences. In those
cases, the opinions formed do not give rise to the same sort of alienation
and inauthenticity, since they are connected in the right way to my own
utilities. They are more akin to the agent who makes the moral decision for
themselves.
I have responded to Paul’s concern elsewhere, where I argue that there
is a crucial difference between these cases (Pettigrew, 2015, 770). When I
set my credences concerning my own utilities by appealing to the statisti-
cal evidence concerning the utilities of others, I do so because I think that
this statistical evidence tells me something about my own utility; it is good
evidence concerning my own utilities. In contrast, when I defer to societal
norms to make a moral decision, I do so not because I think that those
norms tell me anything about my own values; I do not think they provide
good evidence concerning what I think is the correct moral action. I do so
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because I can’t decide what I think is the correct moral action, or I do not
have the courage to follow my own moral compass. I mention Paul’s Au-
thenticity Reply here partly for the sake of completeness, but also because
Moss’ No Knowledge Reply to the Fine-Graining Response also argues that
the problem with such decisions lies in the nature of the evidence on the
basis of which I form my credences about my utilities. Let’s turn to Moss’
reply now.
5 Moss’ No Knowledge Reply
Suppose I set my credences in Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12, etc.,
as above. That is, I set them on the basis of statistical evidence concerning
the utilities that existing parents assign to being a parent. For Paul, the
problem is that such evidence does not sufficiently concern my utilities in
particular; it is too much concerned with the utilities of other people. For
Moss, the problem with those credences is not that they are not sufficiently
concerned with me, or at least that is not the primary problem. Rather, the
problem is that those credences do not constitute knowledge, and rational
decisions must be based on credences that constitute knowledge (Moss, ms,
Section 9.5).
To those unfamiliar with Moss’ work, it might sound as if she is making
a category mistake. Credences, you might think, are simply not the sort of
thing that can constitute knowledge. Full beliefs can — if I believe that
it’s raining, then that belief might count as knowledge. But credences, or
partial beliefs, cannot — if I have credence 0.6 that it’s raining, then it makes
no more sense to say that that credence counts as knowledge than it does
to say that a colourless idea sleeps furiously. Or so you might think. But
Moss denies this (Moss, 2013, ms). Let’s see why.
First, it is worth saying what Moss takes credences to be. Suppose I say
that I’m 50% confident that Kenny is in Hamburg. On the standard inter-
pretation, this means that I have a precise graded attitude — a credence —
towards the standard, non-probabilistic content Kenny is in Hamburg, where
the latter might be represented by a set of possible worlds. In particular, I
have a 0.5 credence in that non-probabilistic content. For Moss, in contrast,
a credence is not a graded attitude towards a standard propositional con-
tent; rather, it is a categorical attitude towards what she calls a probabilistic
content. For instance, to say that I’m 50% confident that Kenny is in Ham-
burg is to say that I have a categorical attitude — in fact, a belief — towards
the probabilistic content Kenny is 50% likely to be in Hamburg.
What are these probabilistic contents? Well, just as a standard proposi-
tional content, such as Kenny is in Hamburg, can be represented by a set of
possible worlds, so a Mossian probabilistic content, such as Kenny is 50%
likely to be in Hamburg, is represented by a set of probability spaces, where a
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probability space is a set of possible worlds together with a probability dis-
tribution defined over those worlds. Thus, the probabilistic content Kenny
is 50% likely to be in Hamburg is represented by the set of those probability
spaces in which the probability distribution assigns 50% to the proposition
Kenny is in Hamburg — that is, the set {P : P(Kenny is in Hamburg) = 0.5}.
Another example: Suppose I say that I’m more confident than not that
Kenny is in Hamburg. On the standard interpretation, this means that I
have an imprecise graded attitude towards the propositional content Kenny
is in Hamburg. Imprecise graded attitudes are also represented by sets
of probability spaces — these are usually called representors. In this case,
my imprecise graded attitude is represented by the set of those probability
spaces in which the probability distribution assigns more than 50% to the
proposition Kenny is in Hamburg — that is, the set {P : P(Kenny is in Hamburg) >
0.5}. That set is my representor. For Moss, in contrast, I do not have a
graded attitude towards the propositional content Kenny is in Hamburg,
but rather a categorical attitude towards the probabilistic content Kenny
is more likely than not to be in Hamburg. The probabilistic content towards
which I have that categorical attitude is in fact represented by the same
set of probability spaces that is used to represent the imprecise graded
attitude that is usually attributed to me — that is, my representor, {P :
P(Kenny is in Hamburg) > 0.5}.
Now, citing a large body of examples, Moss argues that we often say
that, just as beliefs in standard, non-probabilistic contents — viz., proposi-
tions — can count as knowledge, so can beliefs in probabilistic contents —
viz., the contents represented by sets of propositions. For instance, I might
say that Patricia knows that Kenny is 50% likely to be in Hamburg, or that
Jason knows that Kenny is more likely than not to be in Hamburg.
As well as citing intuitive examples in which we ascribe probabilistic
knowledge, Moss also gives examples that show that there are distinctions
between categorical beliefs in probabilistic contents that are analogous to
the distinctions that we mark between different categorical beliefs in propo-
sitions by categorising one as merely justified and the other as knowledge.
For instance, suppose that I know that the objective chance of this coin
landing hands is 60%. And my credence that it will land heads is 0.6 —
that is, in Moss’ framework, I believe that the coin is 60% likely to land
heads. Next, suppose that you also set your credence in heads to 0.6 —
that is, you also believe the coin is 60% likely to land heads. But you set
your credence in this way not because you know the objective chance, but
because you know that Sarah’s credence in heads is 0.6 and you have good
reason to take Sarah to be an expert on the bias of coins. However, while
you are right that Sarah is generally expert on such matters, in this case
she hasn’t actually inspected the coin and instead just plucked a number
from thin air. In such a case, it seems that, while both of us have justified
credences that are correct in a certain sense, yours is merely justified, while
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mine counts as knowledge.
Moss furnishes us with a splendidly detailed account of probabilistic
knowledge, which includes a Bayesian expressivist semantics for proba-
bilistic knowledge ascriptions as well as an account of the factivity, safety,
and sensitivity conditions on probabilistic knowledge. But her No Knowl-
edge Reply to the Fine-Graining Response does not depend on the more
sophisticated or radical elements of her account. Rather, it depends on just
three claims about probabilistic knowledge.
The first, we have met already: it is the claim that credences — and,
more generally, beliefs in probabilistic contents — can count as knowledge,
just as beliefs in non-probabilistic contents can.
The second claim concerns a certain sort of case in which the credences
you form don’t count as knowledge. Suppose we meet. Noting that I am a
living human being, and knowing that about 0.7% of living human beings
will die in the next year, you form a credence of 0.007 that I will die in the
next year. Then, for Moss, your credence does not count as knowledge. The
problem is that you cannot rule out relevant alternative reference classes
to which I belong and amongst which the frequency of death within the
next year is quite different. For instance, you know that I am 35 years old.
And you can’t rule out that the likelihood of death amongst living 35 year
olds is quite different from the likelihood amongst all human beings. You
know that I am male. And you can’t rule out that the likelihood of death
amongst living males is different from the likelihood amongst all human
beings. And so on. You believe that it’s 0.7% likely that I will die in the
coming year, but you can’t rule out that my death is X% likely, for a range
of alternative values of X. Moss likens the case to Goldman’s fake barn
scenario (Goldman, 1976). I am travelling through Fake Barn County, and
I stop in front of a wooden structure that looks like a barn. I form the belief
that the structure in front of me is a barn because that’s what it looks like.
But my visual experience cannot distinguish a barn from a barn facade.
So I cannot rule out the alternative possibility that the structure is a barn
facade. And this alternative is relevant because Fake Barn County lives up
to its name: it’s full of fake barns. Therefore, my belief cannot count as
knowledge. Similarly, since you cannot rule certain alternative reference
classes amongst which my likelihood of death within the next year is quite
different from 0.7%, your credence of 0.007 that I will die in the next year
cannot count as knowledge. Or so Moss says.
Now, recall our response outlined above to Paul’s Utility Ignorance Ob-
jection to decision theory. Since I cannot know the utility I assign to being a
parent, I expanded the set of possible states of the world so that, in each, my
utility is specified; and then I quantified my uncertainty concerning these
different utilities in my credences. Since I could not set those credences by
imaginatively projecting myself into the position of being a parent, I had
to set them by appealing to the statistical evidence concerning the utilities
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that existing parents assigned to being parents. Since the evidence for my
credences is statistical, if it is to count as knowledge, I must be able to rule
out relevant alternative reference classes to which I belong on which the
statistics are quite different. For instance, suppose I set my credences in the
different possible utilities by appealing to the statistics amongst all existing
parents. Then there are certainly relevant alternative references classes that
I should consider: the class of all male parents; the class of all gay male
parents; the class of adoptive parents; the class of all parents with family
and social support network similar to mine; and so on. Given the evidence
on which I based my credences, I cannot rule out the possibility that the
distribution of the three candidate utilities for being a parent is different in
these reference classes from the distribution in the reference class on which
I based my credences. Thus, according to Moss, my credences cannot count
as knowledge.
Finally, the third claim upon which Moss bases her No Knowledge Re-
ply to the Fine-Graining Response is a conjunction of a probabilistic knowl-
edge norm for reasons and a probabilistic knowledge norm for decision —
together, we refer to these as the Probabilistic Knowledge Norms for Action,
following Moss.
Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for Reasons Your credal state
can only provide a reason for a particular choice if it counts as
knowledge.
Probabilistic KnowledgeNorm forDecisions Suppose the strongest
probabilistic content you know is represented by a set P of prob-
ability functions; and suppose you are faced with a choice be-
tween a range of options. It is permissible for you to chose
a particular option iff that option is permissible, according to
the correct decision theory for imprecise credences, for an agent
whose imprecise credal state is represented by P.
For instance, suppose you must choose whether to take an umbrella with
you when you leave the house. The strongest proposition you know is rep-
resented by the set of probability spaces, P = {c : 0.4 < P(Rain) < 0.9}.
If rain is 90% likely, then taking the umbrella maximises expected utility;
if it is only 40% likely, then leaving the umbrella maximises expected util-
ity. Now imagine an agent whose credal state is represented by P — in the
language introduced above, P is her representor.4 Which actions are per-
missible for this agent? According to some decision theories for imprecise
credences, an action is permissible iff it maximises expected utility relative
to at least one member of the representor. We might call these liberal decision
4For more on the correct decision theory for imprecise credences, see (Seidenfeld, 2004;
Seidenfeld et al., 2010; Elga, 2010; Joyce, 2010; Rinard, 2015).
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theories, since they make many actions permissible. On this decision the-
ory, it is permissible to take the umbrella and permissible to leave it. Thus,
according to the Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for Decisions, both actions
are also permissible. According to other decision theories, an action is per-
missible iff it maximises expected utility relative to all members of the repre-
sentor. We might call these conservative decision theories, since they make
few actions permissible. On this decision theory, neither taking nor leav-
ing the umbrella is permissible for the agent with representor P, and thus,
according to the Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for Decisions, neither is
permissible for me.
Thus, putting together the various components of Moss’ No Knowledge
Reply, we have:
(i) the only precise credences I could form concerning the utility I assign
to being a parent do not count as knowledge, because my statistical
evidence doesn’t allow me to rule out alternative reference classes
that are made salient, or relevant, by the high stakes decision I wish
to make based on those credences;
(ii) by the Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for Reasons, these credences
can therefore not provide a reason for me to act in any particular way,
so that if I choose to do whatever maximises expected utility relative
to those credences, my reason for choosing in that way cannot be that
the choice maximised expected utility for me, since that invokes my
credences as a reason;
(iii) by the Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for Decisions, I am not neces-
sarily required to choose the action that maximises expected utility
relative to those credences — they do not correspond to the strongest
probabilistic content I know, and thus what is permissible for me is
not determined by maximising expected utility with respect to them.
What, then, am I required to do? That depends on what my statistical evi-
dence allows me to know, and what the correct decision theory is for impre-
cise credences. As I mentioned already, there are many candidate theories,
including the liberal and conservative versions described above. And on
the question of what my statistical evidence allows me to know, we will
have more to say below.
6 Assessing Moss’ No Knowledge Reply: the Paulian
view
We have now seen Paul’s Utility Ignorance Objection to decision theory, the
Fine-Graining Response, Paul’s Authenticity Reply, and Moss’ No Knowl-
edge Reply. Given this, we can ask two questions: Does Moss’ reply work
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from Paul’s point of view? Does Moss’ reply work independently of Paul’s
point of view? Paul emphasises four important features of her objection.
As we will see, Moss’ reply to the Fine-Graining Response preserves two
of those to some extent and two not at all. We begin with those it doesn’t
preserve.
First, Paul claims that the challenge to decision theory raised by ETEs is
unique to those experiences. Whatever problem they raise, it is not raised
by any other sort of phenomenon. And yet that isn’t true on Moss’ interpre-
tation. Consider the doctor who must choose a treatment for her patient.
She has the following statistical evidence: in 98% of trial cases, the treat-
ment cures the illness; in 2% of trial cases, the patient deteriorates severely.
She sets her credences in line with that. The illness is serious, so this is
a high stakes decision. Thus, other reference classes are relevant, and the
doctor’s evidence cannot rule out that the frequency of successful treat-
ment is very different in those. So, by Moss’ lights, the doctor’s credence
of 0.98 that the treatment will succeed and 0.2 that it will fail do not count
as knowledge and so cannot provide a reason for action. Now, you might
consider that the wrong conclusion or the right one — you might think, for
instance, that the doctor’s credences can provide reason for action, even if
the doctor would prefer to have better evidence. But that is not the issue
here. The issue is only that this other decision faces exactly the same prob-
lems that, for Moss, any decision faces that involves ETEs. That is, ETEs do
not pose any new or distinctive problem for decision theory. And thus, on
Moss’ account, we lose this crucial feature of Paul’s account.
The second distinctive feature of Paul’s account is that, in decisions that
involves ETEs, the problem is first-personal. When I am choosing whether
or not to become a parent, the problem arises, according to Paul, because
I am trying to make a decision for myself about my own future and yet I
cannot access a part of my self that is crucial to the decision, namely, my
utilities. This is why Paul turns to concepts like alienation and authenticity
to account for the phenomenon: they apply to first-personal choices in a
way that they don’t to third-personal ones. However, as the example of
the doctor from above shows, there is nothing distinctively first-personal
in Moss’ diagnosis of the problem with decisions that involve ETEs — the
problem arises just as acutely for a doctor making a major decision for a
patient as it does for me when I try to choose whether or not to adopt.
The first feature of Paul’s account that Moss’ No Knowledge Reply does
preserve and explain, though for quite different reasons, is the importance
of what is at stake in the decision that we wish to use our credences to
make. As Paul and Moss both acknowledge, there are trivial ETEs and im-
portant ones. When I choose whether to spread Vegemite or Marmite on
my toast — having tried neither — I am choosing which ETE to have. But
neither thinks that this poses a problem for decision making in the way
that choosing to become a parent does. Both think it is quite acceptable to
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use statistical evidence about the utilities that others assign to eating those
two condiments as reasons I might cite when making my decision. Paul’s
explanation: only in significant life decisions do alienation and inauthen-
ticity threaten. Moss’ explanation: in low stakes cases, there are no alterna-
tive reference classes that are relevant, and so my credences will constitute
knowledge even if my evidence cannot rule out any alternative reference
classes. Different explanations, but both agree that stakes matter.
The second feature of Paul’s account that Moss’ reply preserves, though
again for quite different reasons, is the attitude to decision theory. It is im-
portant to note that neither Paul nor Moss wish to abandon the machinery
of decision theory in the face of the Utility Ignorance Objection; neither
wishes to reject expected utility theory. Rather, in the case of significant life
decisions that might give rise to ETEs, they advocate changing the decision
problem that we feed into that decision theory. For instance, on the Fine-
Graining Response, when I am deciding whether or not to adopt a child, I
formulate the following decision problem:
• the possible acts are
– Apply,
– Don’t Apply;
• the possible states are
– Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12,
– Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3,
– Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10,
– Fail;
• the doxastic states are my precise or imprecise credences over those
states, on the supposition of those acts;
• the conative states are my utilities over the conjunctions of acts and
states, which encode the overall value I attach to these conjunctions,
incorporating the quality of the phenomenal experience they give me,
the moral and aesthetic values they boast, and so on.
I then feed this decision problem into the machinery of decision theory,
which then tells me which of the possible acts are permitted by rationality
and which are not.
For Paul, the new decision problem that we feed into the machinery of
decision theory is this:
• the possible acts are
– Apply,
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– Don’t Apply,
as before;
• the possible states are
– Succeed,
– Fail;
• the doxastic states are my precise or imprecise credences over the
states, on the supposition of the acts;
• the conative states are my utilities over the conjunctions of acts and
states, but instead of encoding the overall value I attach to these con-
junctions, which Paul has shown we cannot access prior to making
the decision, they encode only the value I assign to the revelatory experi-
ences involved in those conjunctions.
Thus, the conative state specified in the decision problem is different from
that in the orthodox version, while the doxastic state remains the same.
In contrast, for Moss, the new decision problem is this:
• the possible acts are
– Apply,
– Don’t Apply;
• the possible states are
– Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12,
– Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3,
– Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10,
– Fail;
• the doxastic states are not my precise or imprecise credences over the
states, but rather the strongest imprecise states that count as knowledge for
me;
• the conative states are my utilities over the conjunctions of acts and
states, which encode the overall value I attach to these conjunctions,
as in the orthodox approach.
Thus, the doxastic state specified in the decision problem is different from
that in the orthodox version, while the conative state remains the same.
So, again, Paul and Moss agree — the orthodox decision problem should
be replaced. But they agree for different reasons — Paul thinks that the
conative state should be specified differently, while Moss thinks the doxas-
tic state should be specified differently.
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7 Assessing Moss’ No Knowledge Reply: the inde-
pendent view
In this section, we continue to consider Moss’ No Knowledge Reply to the
Fine-Graining Response to Paul’s Utility Ignorance Objection to orthodox
decision theory. But this time we consider it independently of its relation-
ship to Paul’s own reply to that response to her objection. We can read
Moss’ No Knowledge Reply in one of two ways: on the one hand, granted
the possibility of probabilistic knowledge and the accompanying proba-
bilistic versions of the knowledge norms for action — Moss’ Probabilis-
tic Knowledge Norm for Reasons and Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for
Decisions — we can read it as trying to establish that the Fine-Graining
Response is wrong; on the other hand, granted that the Fine-Graining Re-
sponse is wrong, the need to appeal to probabilistic knowledge to explain
why it is wrong is supposed to furnish us with an argument in favour of
probabilistic knowledge, its possibility and its use as a concept in episte-
mology.
The first concern I wish to raise concerns the second reading. I will
argue that a notion of probabilistic knowledge is not, in fact, required in or-
der to explain the problem with decisions involving ETEs in the way Moss
wishes to. The explanation can be given better, in fact, using only the famil-
iar notion of probabilistic justification. The central point is this: the feature
of first-personal utility credences based on statistical evidence that prevents
them from counting as knowledge on Moss’ account also prevents them
from counting as justified. In the Fine-Graining Response outlined in §3
above, I have credence 0.3 in Succeed & utility of being a parent is −12, 0.6 in
Succeed & utility of being a parent is 3, and 0.1 in Succeed & utility of being a parent is 10.
I base these credences on my statistical evidence that 30% of parents assign
utility−12 to being a parent, 60% assign utility 3, and 10% assign utility 10.
Moss claims that these credences do not count as knowledge. I claim that,
if they don’t, they also don’t count as justified.
Moss claims that these credences don’t count as knowledge because my
evidence doesn’t allow me to rule out alternative reference classes that are
rendered relevant by the high stakes of the decision I am making. I claim
that they don’t count as justified for the same reason. After all, the ability
to rule out relevant alternatives is important for justification too. Suppose
Charlie and Craig are identical twins. I know this; I’ve known them for
years. I also know that I can’t tell them apart reliably. I see Craig in the
supermarket and I form the belief that Craig is in front of me. Now, while
true, my belief does not count as knowledge because I can’t rule out the
relevant alternative possibility that it is Charlie in front of me, not Craig.
But equally my inability to rule out this possibility also renders my belief
unjustified. In general, if I believe p and there is an alternative possibility to
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p such that (i) I’m aware of it, (ii) I’m aware that it’s relevant, and (iii) I can’t
rule it out, then my belief in p is not justified. The cases in which my in-
ability to rule out an alternative precludes knowledge but not justification
are those where either I am not aware of the possibility or not aware that it
is relevant. For instance, in Goldman’s Fake Barn County example, either I
am not aware of the possibility of barn facades — perhaps I’ve never heard
of such a thing — or, if I am aware of that possibility, I am not aware that
it is relevant — because I don’t know that I am in Fake Barn County. Thus,
while I might be justified in believing that the structure in front of me is a
barn, my belief doesn’t count as knowledge. However, as soon as I learn
about the possibility of barn facades and learn that I’m currently in Fake
Barn County, my belief is neither justified nor knowledge. And the same
goes for my credences about my utilities in the case of ETEs. Almost what-
ever statistical evidence I have about my utilities for becoming a parent,
there is some relevant alternative reference class in which there are differ-
ent frequencies for the various possible utility assignments such that (i) I’m
aware of that reference class, (ii) I’m aware it’s relevant, and (iii) I can’t rule
it out. Thus, any precise credence that I assign on the basis of that statistical
evidence is not justified.
Thus, it seems to me that Moss’ diagnosis of the problem with the Fine-
Graining Response is wrong. The problem is not that the credences based
on statistical evidence are not knowledge, it’s that they’re not justified. If
that’s right, then the argument in favour of the possibility of probabilistic
knowledge that Moss bases on that diagnosis fails.
But this seems a Pyrrhic victory. If I am right, surely this only makes
the problem worse for the Fine-Graining Response itself. After all, the pos-
sibility of probabilistic knowledge and the putative norms that link it with
reasons and decisions are controversial, whereas the possibility of proba-
bilistic justification and the norms that link it with reasons and decisions are
not. I think most decision theorists would agree that, while there is sense in
which an agent with unjustified credences should maximise expected util-
ity with respect to those credences, that agent will nonetheless not be fully
rational. Thus, we seem to be left with a stronger reply to the Fine-Graining
Response than we had before: we might call it the No Justification Reply.
But this is too quick. All that the considerations so far have shown is
that, if I take a single statistical fact based on the distribution of utilities
amongst people in a single reference class, and set my credences about my
own utilities exactly in line with that, without considering anything else,
then those credences will typically neither be knowledge nor justified. But
there are other, better ways to respond to statistical evidence, and these can
give justified credal states that can then be used to make our ETE decisions.
For instance, suppose I have the statistical evidence from above: 10% of
all parents assign 10 utiles to being a parent, 60% assign 3 utiles, and 30%
assign -12. But I also realise that I have properties that I share with some
19
but not all parents: I enjoy spending time with my nieces and nephew; and
I am a moderately anxious person. Let’s suppose I think that the latter is
the only property I have that affects the utilities I assign to being a par-
ent. That is, I think that the distribution of utilities in the reference class
of people who enjoy being around children is much the same as the distri-
bution of utilities in the reference class of all parents, but the distribution
amongst the reference class of moderately anxious people is quite different
from the distribution in the class of all parents. And let’s suppose that this
belief is justified by my background evidence. Now, I don’t know exactly
what the latter distribution is, since that isn’t included in my body of sta-
tistical evidence, but I have credences in the various possible distributions
that are based on my background evidence. Let’s assume again that those
credences are justified by my background evidence. I then use these cre-
dences, together with my statistical evidence concerning the distribution
of utilities in the reference class of all parents, to set my credences concern-
ing my own utilities for being a parent. The resulting credences will be
justified.
Now notice: these credences will be justified not because I’ve ruled out
the alternative distributions of utilities amongst the alternative reference
classes, but rather because I’ve incorporated my uncertainty about those dif-
ferent distributions into my new credences concerning my utilities for par-
enting. And indeed that is the natural thing to do in the probabilistic set-
ting. For many Bayesian epistemologists, nothing that is possible is ever
completely ruled out; we just assign to it very low credence. This is the
so-called Regularity Principle, and there are various versions determined by
the various different notions of possibility (Shimony, 1955; Stalnaker, 1970;
Lewis, 1980; Jeffrey, 1992). If the Regularity Principle is true, it is too de-
manding to require of an agent with probabilistic attitudes that they rule
out alternative possibilities before they can know anything. Rather, we
might say: in order for a probabilistic attitude to be justified, the agent
must have considered all relevant alternative possibilities and must have
determined their attitude by incorporating their attitudes towards those possi-
bilities. And we can do that in the case of credences concerning ETEs, even
when those credences are based on statistical evidence, as we can see from
the example of my adoption decision described above.
Now, I imagine that Moss might reply: while such credences might be
justified, they will rarely count as knowledge. In order to count as knowl-
edge, she might say, I must not only consider the properties I have that
I think might affect the utility I assign to being a parent, and incorporate
into my credences concerning that utility my uncertainty about the distri-
bution of utilities for being parent amongst the reference classes defined by
those properties; I must also consider the properties I have that will in fact
affect that utility, and incorporate my uncertainty about the distribution
of utilities for being a parent amongst the corresponding reference classes.
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Failing to consider those other properties might not preclude justification
— I might be perfectly justified in not having considered those properties,
and indeed justified in not even being aware of them. But it does preclude
knowledge. Thus, just as I am perfectly justified in ignoring the possibility
that the structure in front of me is a fake barn, but will be unable to know
various propositions if that possibility is relevant in my situation, similarly,
I might be justified in not considering various reference classes and the dis-
tribution of utilities within them, but nonetheless unable to know various
probabilistic content if those reference classes are relevant in my situation.
And thus, Moss might claim, by the Probabilistic Knowledge Norms for
Action, the justified credences that I formed by incorporating my uncer-
tainty about distributions amongst alternative reference classes cannot be
used in rational decision making in the usual way.
The problem with this claim is that it asks too much of us. If, in order to
know a probabilistic content concerning an event in a high stakes situation,
you must have considered all of the causal factors that contribute to it be-
ing likely to a certain degree, there will be almost no probabilistic contents
concerning complex physical phenomena that we’ll know. In a high stakes
situation, I’ll never know that it’s at least 50% likely to rain in the next ten
minutes, even if it is at least 50% likely to rain in the next ten minutes, since
I simply don’t know all of the causal factors that contribute to that — and
indeed knowing those factors is beyond the capabilities of nearly every-
one. There are many situations where, through no fault of our own, we
just do not have the evidence that would be required to have credal states
that count as knowledge. And this is not peculiar to credences concerning
utilities for ETEs, nor even to credences based on statistical evidence.
Now, Moss might reply again: yes, it’s difficult to obtain probabilistic
knowledge; and perhaps we rarely do; and it’s true that people shouldn’t
be held culpable if they violate the Probabilistic Norms of Actions; but that
doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t strive to satisfy them, and it doesn’t mean
that the norms are not true. On this reply, Moss considers the Probabilistic
Norms of Action as analogous to the so-called Truth Norm in epistemology,
which says that we should believe only truths. Certainly, no-one thinks
that those who believe falsehoods are always culpable. But nonetheless the
Truth Norm specifies an ideal for which we should strive; it specifies the
goal at which belief aims; and it gives us a way of assigning epistemic value
to beliefs by measuring how far they fall short of achieving that ideal. Per-
haps that is also the way to understand the Probabilistic Knowledge Norms
for Action. They tell us the ideal towards which our actions should strive;
and they give a way of measuring how well an action has been performed
by measuring how far it falls short of the ideal.
But that can’t be right. Consider the following Non-Probabilistic Knowl-
edge Norm for Reasons. It says that a proposition p can count as your rea-
son for performing an action just in case you know p. That can legitimately
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be said to set an ideal — there really is no extra feature of a categorical atti-
tude towards p that we would want to add once we know p; it just doesn’t
get any better than that. But that isn’t the case for probabilistic knowledge.
Suppose I know that it is at least 50% likely to rain. And suppose I am
deciding whether or not to take my umbrella. The higher the likelihood of
rain, the higher my expected utility. If it’s over 40% likely to rain, I max-
imise my utility by taking my umbrella. Thus, since I know it’s at least 50%
likely to rain, I should take it. But this piece of knowledge is not as good as
it could be. If it’s going to rain, it would be better if I were to believe that
it is 100% likely to rain; if it’s not going to rain, it would be better if I were
to believe that it is 0% likely to rain. What’s more, suppose I believe that
it’s at least 50% likely to rain; and suppose that belief is justified but not
yet knowledge. It isn’t obvious that I do better by gaining evidence that
turns my justified belief that it’s at least 50% likely to rain into knowledge
than by gaining evidence that justifies a belief that it’s at least 90% likely to
rain, but which doesn’t make it knowledge. And if that is not the case, then
knowledge isn’t the goal at which we always aim.
Before we wrap up, I’d like to draw attention to one final point, which
is apt to be neglected. On the orthodox version of decision theory, an agent
is bound to choose in line with her credences and her utilities — in the pre-
cise version of decision theory, for instance, she must pick an act that max-
imises expected utility by the lights of her current precise credences. Both
Moss and Paul argue that this is too demanding in the case of an agent who
has adopted the Fine-Graining Response and who sets her credences in the
fine-grained states in line with the statistical evidence. Requiring that she
chooses in line with her credences, Paul argues, is tantamount to requiring
that she makes her decision by deferring to the utilities of others — and
that way inauthenticity and alienation lie. For Moss, on the other hand,
it is not reasonable to demand that an agent choose in line with beliefs in
certain probabilistic contents — which is, after all, what her credences are
— when she cannot rule out other probabilistic contents.
However, it is worth noting that the demand that orthodox decision the-
ory makes is in fact rather weak. Suppose P is the set of credence functions
that represents the strongest probabilistic content that you know. Then, in
many cases, and certainly the cases under consideration here, P is also the
set of all and only the credence functions that you are justified in adopting.
Then, while it is true that, once you have picked your credence function
P from P, you are bound to maximise expected utility with respect to P,
you are not bound to pick any particular credence function from P — you
might pick P, but equally you might pick any other P′ 6= P from P, and you
would be equally justified whichever you picked. Thus, the set of permis-
sible choices for you is in fact exactly the same according to the orthodox
view and according to Moss’ Probabilistic Knowledge Norm for Decisions,
when that is coupled with a liberal decision theory for imprecise credences.
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In each case, an act is permissible if there is a credence function P in P such
that the act maximises expected utility from the point of view of P.
I conclude, then, that Moss’ No Knowledge Reply to the Fine-Graining
Response does not work. I agree with Moss that credences that are based
directly on sparse statistical evidence do not constitute probabilistic knowl-
edge. But I argue that they are not justified either. And it is their lack of
justification that precludes their use in decision-making, not their failure
to count as knowledge. What’s more, there are ways to set credences in
the light of purely statistical evidence that gives rise to justified credences.
Moss may say that these do not count as knowledge, and I’d be happy to
accept that. But if she then also demands that credences used in decision
making should be knowledge, I think the standard is set too high. Or, if
she thinks that probabilistic knowledge simply serves as an ideal towards
which we ought to strive, then there are times when I ought to abandon that
ideal — there are times when I ought to pass up getting closer to knowledge
in one probabilistic content in order to get justification in a more precise and
useful probabilistic content.
8 Conclusion
In the end, then, I conclude that the Fine-Graining Response to Paul’s Util-
ity Ignorance Objection to decision theory is safe. Paul’s Authenticity Re-
ply does not work, as I have argued elsewhere. And nor does Moss’ No
Knowledge Reply, as I have argued here.
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